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BOSTOCK V. CLAYTON COUNTY AND THE
PROBLEM OF BISEXUAL ERASURE
Nancy C. Marcus
ABSTRACT—The Supreme Court’s Bostock v. Clayton County opinion,
affirming that Title VII’s sex discrimination protections extend to “gay
and transgender” employees, is an opinion emphatically grounded in a
textualism-based analysis. It is also an opinion that does not once mention
bisexuals in its text.
The bisexual erasure in the opinion is not unusual; in the nearly
quarter century leading up to Bostock, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
failed to explicitly acknowledge the existence or equal rights of bisexuals.
While bi erasure in Supreme Court cases is not new, in the case of
Bostock, the problematic nature of omitting bisexuals from the text of the
opinion takes on an additional and ironic dimension: Those seeking to
apply Bostock’s holding to bisexuals must contend with a unique tension
between the majority opinion’s textualism emphasis and the need to read
beyond the literal text of the holding’s limited “gay and transgender”
language to ensure that it applies to bisexuals as well.
Along with calling for greater bi inclusivity, this Essay offers an
interpretive guide to ensuring Bostock’s precedent, textualist emphasis
notwithstanding, is extended to bisexuals. While resolving such tensions,
the Essay also describes how systemic bi erasure in LGBTQ rights cases
beyond Bostock remains a significant problem. In doing so, it explains the
reciprocal benefits of being bi-inclusive, including the role bisexuals can
play in illustrating that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex
discrimination.
AUTHOR—Attorney in Southern California and cofounder of BiLaw, the
first national organization of bisexual lawyers, law professors, and law
students. I am grateful to Ezra Young for his invaluable feedback and for
his own leadership and advocacy for positive and meaningful “BT”
inclusion in LGBT rights advocacy.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States entered into a new era of Supreme Court LGBTQ1
rights jurisprudence with Justice Kennedy’s retirement in 2018. Until his
retirement, Justice Kennedy was the author of every Supreme Court
decision affirming LGBTQ rights while he was on the bench and was thus
a particularly critical swing vote and voice in LGBTQ rights cases.2 The
confirmation of two new Justices, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, compounded
uncertainty about how the new Court would rule on LGBTQ rights cases
that come before it. However, the Court’s 6–3 decision in Bostock v.
Clayton County3 handed the LGBTQ rights movement a somewhat
unexpected victory.4
Despite the clumsy and tone-deaf “homosexual and transgender”
vernacular used by Justice Gorsuch5—as compared to the equal-dignityembracing opinions authored by Justice Kennedy in past sexual
orientation discrimination cases6—the Bostock opinion was reassuring in
its affirmation of employment discrimination protections for gay and
1
In this Essay, “LGBTQ” is intended to include not just lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender
people, but other sexual minorities as well such as intersex people, pansexual people, and those of
other minority sexual orientations and gender identities.
2
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); see also Alicia
Parlapiano & Jugal K. Patel, With Kennedy’s Retirement, The Supreme Court Loses its Center, N.Y.
TIMES (June 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/06/27/us/politics/kennedyretirement-supreme-court-median.html [https://perma.cc/K3DJ-UT84] (providing an overview of
Justice Kennedy’s votes in landmark cases).
3
Bostock v. Clayton County, (U.S. Sup. Ct. Case No. 17-1618), Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda
(U.S. Sup. Ct. Case No. 17-1623); R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity
Comm’n (U.S. Sup. Ct. Case No. 18-107), consolidated as Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct.
1731 (2020) (collectively, “Bostock”).
4
See Adam Liptak, Civil Rights Law Protects Gay and Transgender Workers, Supreme Court
Rules, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/15/us/gay-transgenderworkers-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/89N5-H3Q2].
5
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738, 1747, 1749, 1751.
6
See, e.g., Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 657–66, 677–81; Windsor, 570 U.S. at 764, 768–71;
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567, 575.
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transgender people. After framing the issue as “whether an employer can
fire someone simply for being homosexual or transgender,” the Court
concluded, “[t]he answer is clear. An employer who fires an individual
for being homosexual or transgender fires that person for traits or actions
it would not have questioned in members of a different sex.”7 Repeating
the holding at the end of the opinion, the Court at least substituted “gay”
for “homosexual,” concluding that “[a]n employer who fires an individual
merely for being gay or transgender defies the law.”8
Yet, bisexuals, who were omitted from the Court’s “homosexual and
transgender” and “gay and transgender” framing, are left struggling to
reconcile conflicting emotions in the aftermath of Bostock’s release: relief
that the Court affirmed Title VII sex discrimination protection9 for sexual
minorities, and dismay at the bisexual erasure in the framing and
subsequent media coverage of the opinion. As a result, bisexual attorneys
are forced to expend a frustrating amount of energy reassuring other
members of the bi community that bisexuals are protected under the law
along with gay and transgender people, despite Bostock’s failure to
explicitly include us in its text.10
Part I of this Essay explores the problem of transcending Bostock’s
bisexual erasure and explains why, despite the opinion’s textualist
emphasis and the bisexual erasure in the text of Bostock, the Court’s
affirmation of Title VII protection against employment discrimination in
Bostock nonetheless applies to bisexual employees. Namely, this Part
discusses how canons of case law interpretation counsel in favor of
including bisexuals; how the opinion’s analytical grounds for protecting
gay and transgender individuals extend to bisexual individuals; how
nothing in the opinion indicates it is meant to be read narrowly to exclude
bisexuals; and how Supreme Court cases from the past quarter century
have been interpreted to apply to bisexuals even without explicit
acknowledgement of bi individuals. Part II then addresses the harms that
flow from bisexual erasure, including the increased burden put on

7

Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737.
Id. at 1754.
9
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
10
See Heron Greenesmith, Supreme Court LGBTQ Protections Cover Bisexual and Pansexual
Workers, Too, TEEN VOGUE (June 18, 2020), https://www.teenvogue.com/story/supreme-courtlgbtq-protections-bisexual-pansexual-workers [https://perma.cc/5J2Y-QGEK] (explaining that
Bostock’s protections extend to bisexual and pansexual employees but that this erasure by the Court
and media is nonetheless harmful). Indeed, one individual in the bi community expressed concern
after reading the opinion stating, “I am seriously wondering if bisexual people are included in
yesterday’s ruling, because I haven’t heard that identity mentioned once in any reporting or reading
of the opinion.” Id.
8
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bisexual litigants, the perpetuation of bisexual stereotypes, and the
tangible harms resulting from bisexuals’ lack of formal recognition and
support. The effects of bi erasure also extend beyond the bisexual
community, for example, by undermining the integrity of LGBTQ rights
arguments. Finally, Part III argues that in failing to address bisexuality
the Court squandered an opportunity to describe with more clarity and
cohesiveness how sexual orientation discrimination is, in fact, a form of
sex discrimination.
I.

TRANSCENDING TEXTUALIST TENSIONS IN APPLYING BOSTOCK TO
BISEXUALS

There is an immediate irony-soaked problem with trying to
minimize the harm of the Court’s bi erasure in Bostock with the argument
that, even if bisexuality is not mentioned in the text of the majority
opinion, the Court surely intended its ruling to extend to bisexuals. The
irony of such platitudes encouraging bi people to overlook the literal text
of the Bostock holding is that Bostock is a textualism-embracing opinion
to an extreme. To the anguish of conservative legal theorists, the opinion
even divorces textualism from originalism in its adamance that where text
is unambiguous, interpretation must stop at the plain meaning and not
consider legislative intent.11 For example, in rejecting the dissenters’
arguments about what Title VII’s drafters may have intended to cover, the
majority opinion admonished that “[w]hen the express terms of a statute
give us one answer and extratextual considerations suggest another, it’s
no contest. Only the written word is the law, and all persons are entitled
to its benefit.”12
As such, the fact that the text of Bostock’s holding only explicitly
acknowledges protections for “gay and transgender” people seems a
legitimate source of concern for bisexuals, considering the ruling was
based on a textualist analysis that emphasized not reading beyond the text
in statutory interpretation. That said, there are several reasons for
bisexuals to be reassured that the rights affirmed in Bostock should, and
in fact do, trickle down to bisexuals, even if the Court did not explicitly
say so.
First, the canons of statutory interpretation that demand strict plainlanguage textualism in the face of unambiguous language do not govern
case law interpretation. There are no comparable canons of common law
11

See Tim Ryan, Legal Theory Debate Rages After High Court LGBT Ruling, COURTHOUSE
NEWS SERV. (June 17, 2020), https://www.courthousenews.com/legal-theory-debate-rages-afterhigh-court-lgbt-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/8E73-6BP5].
12
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737.
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or case law interpretations proscribing strict textualism, or, conversely,
prohibiting interpreting the holding of a case in light of its surrounding
context. Thus, while the dicta and procedural history of a case may not
have the precedential weight of the law that a holding does, when an
appellate court affirms or reverses a ruling, it is impossible to interpret
the word “affirm” or “reverse” without consideration of what it is that is
being affirmed or reversed, i.e., the lower court opinion. For example, it
is a pertinent and permissible consideration that Bostock explicitly
affirmed the Second Circuit’s en banc ruling in Zarda v. Altitude Express,
Inc., which did not single out only gay and transgender people for
protection under Title VII, but rather affirmed more generally that “sexual
orientation discrimination is an actionable subset of sex discrimination.”13
Thus, since Zarda broadly includes sexual orientation discrimination as
sex discrimination, so does Bostock in affirming Zarda.
Second, other than the “gay and transgender” language, there is
nothing in the opinion indicating that the Court intended it to be
interpreted narrowly or limited to the facts of the case at hand. In fact,
despite the Court’s embrace of textualism in statutory interpretation, the
Court balances textualism with a healthy dose of label flexibility in its
discussion of how the law is applied. The Bostock majority explains that
“[a]s enacted, Title VII prohibits all forms of discrimination because of
sex, however they may manifest themselves or whatever other labels
might attach to them.”14 The Court’s consideration of “whatever other
labels might attach” acknowledges that those labels listed and discussed
in the opinion are not exhaustive and therefore allows for more identities,
including bisexuality, to be protected. In the same vein, Bostock will
likely be applied beyond the context of employment discrimination as
well; its analysis extends to other applications, such as anti-discrimination
protections in educational and health care settings.15
And, third, if the Court’s use of label flexibility wasn’t convincing,
the underlying analysis of the opinion logically extends beyond gay and
transgender people, to both bisexuals and other sexual minorities. This
includes the Court’s explanation that sexual orientation discrimination is
sex discrimination because “homosexuality and transgender status are
inextricably bound up with sex” and thus “to discriminate on these
13

883 F.3d 100, 132 (2d Cir. 2018).
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1747.
15
See Julie Moreau, Supreme Court’s LGBTQ Ruling Could Have ‘Broad Implications,’ Legal
Experts Say, NBC NEWS (June 23, 2020, 3:40 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbcout/supreme-court-s-lgbtq-ruling-could-have-broad-implications-legal-n1231779 [https://perma.cc/
5BZL-BZK9].
14
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grounds requires an employer to intentionally treat individual employees
differently because of their sex.”16 As the Court illustrates, in the context
of a job application requiring an applicant to check a “homosexual” or
“transgender” box,
[t]here is no way for an applicant to decide whether to check the homosexual
or transgender box without considering sex. To see why, imagine an
applicant doesn’t know what the words homosexual or transgender mean.
Then try writing out instructions for who should check the box without using
the words man, woman, or sex (or some synonym). It can’t be done.
Likewise, there is no way an employer can discriminate against those who
check the homosexual or transgender box without discriminating in part
because of an applicant’s sex.17

The same, by logical extension, is true of other sexual minorities,
including bisexuals. And when a bisexual person is discriminated against
for having a picture of her same-sex partner on her desk, it is unlikely that
a person will stop to clarify whether she is bisexual or gay before
discriminating against her. It is her sex in relation to her female romantic
partner that triggers the discrimination, not necessarily where precisely
she lies on the sexual orientation “Kinsey scale.”18
A fourth and more cynical reason that bisexual people should not be
concerned is that bisexuals have frequently been rendered invisible in
LGBTQ rights cases,19 but they have nonetheless been understood to be
16

Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1742; see also id. at 1742–43 (rejecting pretextual “it was really sexual
orientation” defenses against sex discrimination claims, because discrimination against gay and
transgender employees necessarily takes their sex into account, and Title VII only requires that
discrimination be “in part because of sex” to establish liability).
17
Id. at 1746.
18
That said, allegations of pure sexual orientation discrimination also do not preclude a Title VII
claim from being actionable, due to the Title VII causation standard allowing for multiple factors, as
discussed herein. For more on the history and meaning of the Kinsey scale and other ways of defining
bisexuality and sexual orientation, see Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure,
52 STAN. L. REV. 353, 380–81 (2000) (including a description of the “Kinsey scale” which depicts a
continuum of sexual orientation).
19
See Nancy C. Marcus, Bridging Bisexual Erasure in LGBT-Rights Discourse and Litigation,
22 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 291, 306–15, 343–44 (2015) (documenting how bisexuals have been
excluded from the majority of briefs and opinions of LGBTQ rights cases since Romer). Bisexuals
were referenced over a dozen times between the briefs and decision for the 1995 Supreme Court case
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995). Brief for
Respondent, Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (No.
94-749), 1995 WL 143532. But from Romer onward bisexuals have almost never been mentioned.
517 U.S. 620 (1996); see, e.g., Boy Scouts v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693
(2013); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015); see also infra notes 28–31 and accompanying
text discussing Romer. Similarly, bisexuals and bisexuality have almost never been mentioned in
federal appellate decisions and briefs in LBGTQ rights cases. See Marcus, supra, at 311–15.
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equally protected by such “gay rights” opinions.20 When bisexual
existence is deemed unworthy of mention, bi erasure is itself also deemed
insignificant, particularly by those who do not comprehend bisexuality as
an equally valid and independent sexual orientation in the first place, as
opposed to just a variant of or phase on the way to becoming a “real”
gay.21 As such, because neither bisexual existence nor erasure is accorded
significant weight in the grander doctrinal scheme, bisexuals are told not
to worry, that they can always scurry under the broader “gay rights” and
“gay and transgender rights” umbrellas even if they were not explicitly
invited to seek shelter through legal doctrine acknowledging them along
with the rest of the LGBTQ community.
Each of these arguments provide solid grounds for interpreting
Bostock as extending beyond the specific classes of sexual minorities
named in the opinion. And each can and should be made in response to
those who try to limit the reach of Bostock to only gay and transgender
employees in the future.
Indeed, such issues may arise in a pending case involving a bisexual
seeking Title VII protection, Breiner v. Board of Education,22 in which a
bisexual teacher was allegedly fired because of his bisexual orientation.
The case is currently pending at the federal appellate level after the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky denied Breiner’s claim
prior to the Bostock decision.23 In doing so, the court explained that the
Sixth Circuit in Vickers v. Fairfield had previously declined to recognize
sexual orientation as a prohibited basis for discrimination under Title

20
This phenomenon is evidenced by the media reports following the Court’s opinion in Bostock.
Several outlets referred to the opinion as a victory for “lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender” people
without realizing that the opinion did not explicitly mention bisexuals. See Ryan Thoreson, US
Supreme Court Ruling a Victory for LGBT Workers, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 15, 2020, 4:03 PM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/15/us-supreme-court-ruling-victory-lgbt-workers
[https://per
ma.cc/K37V-RMC7]; see also Rebecca L. Baker & Caroline Melo, Supreme Court Rules Title VII
Bars Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, NAT’L L. REV. (June
15, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/supreme-court-rules-title-vii-bars-discriminationbasis-sexual-orientation-and [https://perma.cc/2C6N-FUAN] (explaining that the Court’s holding
“protects lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender workers” from employment discrimination under
Title VII); Spencer Bokat-Lindell, Opinion, Why the Supreme Court Ruling on L.G.T.B.Q. Rights Is
Such a Big Deal, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/16/opinion/lgbttrans-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/QG26-XNT9] (mentioning that the opinion meant
employers could not “fire someone for being gay, bisexual or transgender”).
21
See generally Yoshino, supra note 18 (discussing roots of bisexual erasure by both
heterosexual and homosexual communities).
22
See No. 5:18-351, 2019 WL 454117, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 25, 2019), appeal filed, No. 19-5123
(6th Cir. Feb. 28, 2019) (Mr. Breiner’s name was misspelled in the district court as Briener, but has
been corrected to throughout).
23
Id.
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VII.24 The district court, however, flagged language in a subsequent Sixth
Circuit case acknowledging “practical problems” with such a limiting
approach to Title VII, but nonetheless explained that the Vickers ruling
“remains controlling authority unless an inconsistent decision of the
United States Supreme Court requires modification of the decision or this
Court sitting en banc overrules the prior decision.”25 Bostock had not yet
been decided when those words were written, so the stage is clearly set
for the Sixth Circuit to revisit Title VII’s sexual orientation discrimination
coverage, and in a case involving a bisexual plaintiff, no less.
II. THE HARMS OF BI ERASURE IN BOSTOCK AND BEYOND
In my experience writing about the problem of bisexual erasure over
the years, I have frequently been asked why it even matters that bisexuals
are erased from LGBTQ rights cases. Indeed, I can well imagine one
reading this Essay asking: So what? Why does it matter that bisexuals
were not deemed worthy of mention in Bostock? What’s the real harm in
bisexuals not being mentioned a single time in the majority opinion,
including in the Court’s ultimate holding? How does it seriously hurt
anyone that it was only Justice Alito’s and Justice Kavanaugh’s dissents,
not even the majority opinion, that acknowledged that sexual orientation
includes bisexuality?26
The most immediate harms are plentiful. As set forth in Part I, unlike
gay and transgender litigants, bisexuals seeking Title VII sex
discrimination protections cannot make their case by simply quoting
Bostock’s holding that “[a]n employer who fires an individual merely for
being gay or transgender defies the law.”27 Bostock’s omission of
bisexuals forces advocates into a complicated and messy posture, having
to explain how it is that in an opinion based on textualism, it does not
matter that bisexuals are not included in the opinion’s text. The fact that
bisexuals and their advocates must overcome additional hurdles that gay
and transgender litigants do not face is inequitable. Such additional
burdens relegate bisexuals to second class status, requiring them to
explain away their own erasure in Bostock. These additional, inequitable
burdens would not have emanated from a decision that explicitly included

24

Id.
Id. (citing Tumminello v. Father Ryan High Sch., Inc., 678 F. App’x 281, 285 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 13 S. Ct. 121 (2017)).
26
See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1758 n.8 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at
1830 n.6 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (both citing to definitions of sexual orientation that explicitly
include bisexuality).
27
Id. at 1754 (majority opinion).
25
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bisexuals in its coverage, or one that at least framed its holding in broader
terms of sexual orientation and gender identity or LGBTQ people.
These concerns—that future defendants in bisexual discrimination
cases must rely on the “gay and transgender”-specific language of
Bostock to prove their case—has turned celebration to trepidation for
bisexual Court-watchers. While the rest of the LGBTQ community
celebrates Bostock, some bisexuals have responded to the decision with
uncertainty about the repercussions of the Court’s failure to acknowledge
their existence and rights.28
This is not a new problem. In failing to mention bisexuals, Bostock
continues a harmful tradition of bisexual erasure in Supreme Court
opinions, a problem beginning with the Court’s 1996 decision in Romer
v. Evans. Prior to Romer—in which the Supreme Court struck down an
amendment to the Colorado Constitution, Amendment 2, that barred local
governments from treating “homosexual, lesbian or bisexual” citizens as
a protected class29—Supreme Court opinions were comparatively biinclusive.30 That changed with Romer, when the Court chose to redefine
the class of persons affected by Amendment 2 as “only gay people,” even
though the text of Amendment 2 explicitly prohibited civil rights
discrimination based on “homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation,
conduct, practices or relationships.”31 Subsequent LGBTQ rights
Supreme Court decisions have similarly failed to mention bisexuals by
name.32
In Bostock, reminiscent of Romer, the Supreme Court ignored
bisexuality in its analysis, in part following the lead of some of the
attorneys in that case. The attorneys for Mr. Bostock, for example, failed
to acknowledge the existence of bisexuals even once in their petition for
writ of certiorari, framing the case instead as one that affects “all the gay
and lesbian workers across [the] country,”33 urging the Court to end
workplace discrimination against “[g]ay and [l]esbian [e]mployees.”34
Such bi-erasing language made it all the easier for the Court to

28

See Greenesmith, supra note 10.
517 U.S. 620, 624, 626 (1996).
30
See supra note 19.
31
See Marcus, supra note 19, at 307.
32
See id. at 306–15, 343–44 (documenting the bi erasure in court opinions over the decades).
33
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (No.
17-1618).
34
Id. at 26.
29
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subsequently further abbreviate the class of persons affected by its ruling
as homosexual/gay and transgender people.35
This is not just a problem of semantics; the more courts do not
explicitly acknowledge the existence of bisexuals the less willing
attorneys may be to bring discrimination cases on their behalf.
Reciprocally, the fewer cases are brought on behalf of bisexuals, the less
likely court opinions are to be bi-inclusive. This perpetual cycle of bi
erasure makes it difficult to find any case law addressing discrimination
against bisexuals, even though they are explicitly included in many state
discrimination statutes.36
The harms stemming from Bostock’s bi erasure extend farther than
the opinion itself, as it compounds the serious harms that emanate from
bi erasure in general. The failure of courts to recognize bisexuality as a
valid sexual orientation can have tragic, even life-or-death, repercussions.
Too often, for example, bisexual parents are subjected to negative custody
or adoption determinations when their bisexual orientation is unjustly
conflated with instability.37 Additionally, in the context of immigration
and asylum, bisexual asylees seeking refuge from countries that persecute
people for their sexual orientation have been disbelieved and treated with
suspicion by asylum adjudicators who do not consider bisexuality as a
valid sexual orientation.38 Such adjudicators have penalized bisexual
asylees for not being “gay enough,” at times denying them asylum and
sending them back to the countries where they faced persecution for their
sexual orientation.39 Finally, in criminal cases, misapprehension of
35

See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737, 1741–49, 1751, 1753.
See generally Jerome Hunt, A State-by-State Examination of Nondiscrimination Laws and
Policies, CTR. AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUND (2012) (cataloging the twenty-two states that explicitly
include bisexuals in their antidiscrimination statutes); see also Ann E. Tweedy & Karen Yescavage,
Employment Discrimination Against Bisexuals: An Empirical Study, 21 WM. & MARY J. RACE,
GENDER, & SOC. JUST., 699, 709–10 (2015) (documenting the lack of published cases addressing
claims by bisexuals, and explaining that even in employment discrimination cases involving claims
by bisexual plaintiffs, “it seems to be virtually unheard of for a bisexual plaintiff to succeed in such
a claim on the merits”).
37
See Marcus, supra note 19, at 318–20; RUTH COLKER, HYBRID: BISEXUALS, MULTIRACIALS,
AND OTHER MISFITS UNDER AMERICAN LAW 39(1996); Patricia M. Logue, The Rights of Lesbian
and Gay Parents and Their Children, 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 95, 95 (2002) (discussing nonheterosexual custody cases almost exclusively in terms of gay and lesbian individuals, not bisexuals).
38
See Marcus, supra note 19, at 316–18; Thom Senzee, Bisexual Seeking Asylum Resorts to
Photos When Asked to Prove It, ADVOCATE (May 11, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://www.advocate.com/
world/2015/05/10/bisexual-asylum-seeker-humiliated-trying-prove-sexuality-uk-officials-0
[https://perma.cc/VED2-WYNS]; Joe Morgan, Mother of Bisexual Asylum Seeker Will Sue Britain if
They Send Her Son Home to Die, GAY STAR NEWS (Apr. 24, 2015), https://www.gaystarnews.com/
article/mother-bisexual-asylum-seeker-will-sue-britain-if-they-send-her-son-home-die240415/
[https://perma.cc/8CBH-BFH9].
39
See Marcus, supra note 19, at 316–18.
36
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bisexuality can have dire consequences, as bisexual defendants risk losing
their freedom when judges, prosecutors, or jurors view bisexuality as an
indicator of deceptiveness and, by extension, criminal behavior.40
The stigma of bisexual erasure can have other grave consequences
as well. Bisexuals already suffer from a comparative lack of community
and resources and disproportionately high rates of employment
discrimination and pay disparity, mental and physical health problems,
suicide and suicidal ideation rates, and violence—including intimate
partner violence, domestic violence, rape and sexual assault.41 Bi erasure
compounds such disparities as bisexuals internalize the stigma of bi
erasure and may be subjected to increased violence and hostilities from
those who do not recognize bisexuality as valid.42 The more bisexuals are
ignored, and are consequently misunderstood by courts, lawmakers, and
broader society, the more these dangerous disparities grow.
Bisexual erasure also hurts the integrity of LGBTQ rights discourse
by perpetuating false dichotomies, reinforcing inaccurate paradigms that
require persons to fall under either a gay or straight category to be entitled
to formal recognition.43 A legal system that serves and reflects the
40
See Nancy Marcus, Legally Bi: “The Staircase” Tells the Case of an Anti-Bi Bias in Our
Courts, BI.ORG (Aug. 25, 2018), https://bi.org/en/articles/legally-bi-the-staircase-tells-the-case-ofan-anti-bi-bias-in-our-courts [https://perma.cc/S6SY-W6JK] (reviewing the Netflix documentary
film, The Staircase, which documented, among other things, the role that anti-bisexual biases played
in the murder conviction of American novelist Michael Peterson.)
41
See generally MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, INVISIBLE MAJORITY: THE DISPARITIES
FACING BISEXUAL PEOPLE AND HOW TO REMEDY THEM (2016) [hereinafter INVISIBLE MAJORITY],
https://www.lgbtmap.org/invisible-majority
[https://perma.cc/ZJ8Y-5FM5]
(extensively
documenting statistical evidence of each of these types of disparities, and proposing policy-based
methods of addressing the disparities); HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN FOUND., BINET USA, BISEXUAL RES.
CTR. & BISEXUAL ORG. PROJECT, HEALTH DISPARITIES AMONG BISEXUAL PEOPLE,
https://assets2.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/HRC-BiHealthBrief.pdf?_ga=2.2
41924161.251517611.1592273885-1684528672.1590802494
[https://perma.cc/S97M-6QFA]
(addressing health disparities faced by bisexuals).
42
See INVISIBLE MAJORITY, supra note 41, at 1 (describing the report’s findings in a variety of
areas as collectively “show[ing] how bias, stigma, discrimination, and invisibility combine to create
serious negative outcomes for bisexual people,” including “pervasive discrimination and key
disparities”); id. at 6 (describing how the lack of studies and analyses addressing bisexuals render it
hard to understand and address the disparities faced by bi people, as undeniable as those disparities
are); id. at 12 (explaining that “a lack of understanding about bisexuality may mean that an
immigration official may unfairly discount a bisexual person’s application for asylum by assuming
that the applicant is actually heterosexual”); id. at 18 (addressing how studies examining health
outcomes have ignored the needs and experiences of bisexual men, impacting data analysis of HIV
prevention, treatment, and care).
43
For a comprehensive discussion of the “bipolar injustice” of false dichotomies, and how a “bi
jurisprudence” that sheds light on the flaws of either/or, black-and-white paradigms could also
provide a model for transcending false dichotomies in other contexts such as race, gender, and
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existence of all persons, not just those who fall within black-and-white
polarized binaries, should acknowledge the existence and realities of
bisexuals and others (including those of nonbinary gender identities, for
example) who do not fit within rigid binary definitional boxes.
Moreover, bisexual erasure undermines the bedrock principles upon
which LGBTQ rights advocacy often rests. For example, the historic
Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell decisions were grounded in
principles of equal dignity, principles advocated for by LGBTQ rights
attorneys and embraced by the Court. In the context of sexual orientation,
these cases eschewed second-class treatment of gay people and same-sex
couples (even while, as described, erasing bi people) in favor of equal
respect, autonomy, and dignity.44 Emphasizing those principles broadly in
LGBTQ rights advocacy, while simultaneously not protecting with equal
force the equal dignity and respect to bisexuals, ultimately hurts not just
bisexuals, but also the consistency and coherence of LGBTQ rights
arguments.45
Finally, the bisexual erasure in Bostock’s text costs the Court its own
credibility, as it is a dishonest reframing of the issue at its core. An
analysis of the Court’s reasoning in Lawrence v. Texas, which overruled
the infamous Bowers v. Hardwick decision—a 1986 decision that upheld
sodomy bans as constitutional after reframing the issue to be
inappropriately homosexuality-specific by asking whether individuals
had a “fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy”46—provides
an apt illustration of how Bostock, like Bowers, harms the Court’s
credibility. In Lawrence, the Court condemned the underlying Bowers
analysis, beginning with the Bowers Court’s initial improper reframing of
the question presented. As the Lawrence Court described Bowers:
The Court began its substantive discussion in Bowers as follows: ‘The issue
presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right
upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of
the many States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a
disability, see generally COLKER, supra note 37, at 15–232. Professor Colker’s model for using a “bi
jurisprudence” as a tool for deconstructing harmful and false dichotomies could be applied in myriad
other contexts as well.
44
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 657–66, 677–81 (2015); United States v. Windsor,
570 U.S. 744, 764, 768–75 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567, 575 (2003).
45
See Marcus, supra note 19, at 324–36 (describing how bi erasure in legal argument harms the
broader LGBTQ community, resulting in statistical inaccuracies in legal argument, the perpetuation
of false dichotomies and isolationist paradigms, the undermining of equal liberty arguments, and
missed opportunities in refining legal analyses).
46
478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Notably, the
text of the statute at issue in that case, Ga. Code Ann. § 16–6–2 (1984), did not restrict its sodomy
ban to only gay, or homosexual, people. See id. at 188 n.1.
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very long time.’ That statement, we now conclude, discloses the Court’s
own failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake.47

Such a narrow framing had allowed the Bowers Court to mock the claim
to the liberty interests at issue in that case as “at best, facetious.”48
In the opening paragraph of Bostock, the Court similarly
misrepresents the question at issue in the sexual orientation cases as
“whether an employer can fire someone simply for being homosexual or
transgender.”49 However, the actual question presented in Bostock and
Zarda was “[w]hether discrimination against an employee because of
sexual orientation constitutes prohibited employment discrimination
‘because of . . . sex’ within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.”50 In reframing the issue in overly specific “homosexual and
transgender” terms, the Court invites ridicule of the issue in the case as
facetious in its overly narrow (and antiquated) “homosexual and
transgender” framing. And, perhaps even more important, in reframing
the issue that was asked of it in such narrow terms, the Court peddles in
inaccuracy, because that, quite simply, was not the question asked of the
Court.
In the end, bisexual erasure has created hurdle after hurdle, in legal
contexts and otherwise, for bisexuals seeking fair and just treatment under
the law. The Bostock holding, while certainly a victory for LGBTQ
equality overall, is at the same time yet another inequitable hurdle in the
path of bisexual advocacy.
III. HOW BI INCLUSION COULD HAVE BUTTRESSED THE BOSTOCK
ANALYSIS
Omitting bisexuality from the analysis of Title VII’s protections for
LGBTQ people also results in a flawed analysis and, reciprocally, a
missed opportunity to illustrate how sexual orientation discrimination is
a form of sex discrimination, i.e., the central issue in Bostock.

47

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566–67 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190).
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194; see also Nancy C. Marcus, Beyond Romer and Lawrence: The Right
to Privacy Comes Out of the Closet, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 355, 395–98 (2006) (explaining that
the application of strict “fundamental rights” semantics in due process jurisprudence both endangers
individual rights and is inconsistent with Supreme Court substantive due process precedent).
49
Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020).
50
Question Presented, Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (No. 17-1618),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/17-01618qp.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7WD-N4Y2]; see also
Question Presented, Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda, No. 17-1623, https://www.supremecourt.gov
/qp/17-01623qp.pdf [https://perma.cc/QTM4-5WZW] (presenting the same issue as, and
consolidated with, Bostock).
48
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Keeping in mind that the Court in Bostock rejected the employers’
formulation of the Title VII “but-for” analysis that sex is the only
causative factor in an adverse employment action,51 bisexuals could
nonetheless be quite instrumental in debunking even those poorly framed
“but-for” arguments. The Bostock majority describes the employer
argument as follows:
The employers illustrate their concern with an example. When we apply the
simple [“but-for”] test to Mr. Bostock—asking whether Mr. Bostock, a man
attracted to other men, would have been fired had he been a woman—we
don’t just change his sex. Along the way, we change his sexual orientation
too (from homosexual to heterosexual). If the aim is to isolate whether a
plaintiff’s sex caused the dismissal, the employers stress, we must hold
sexual orientation constant—meaning we need to change both his sex and
the sex to which he is attracted. So, for Mr. Bostock, the question should be
whether he would’ve been fired if he were a woman attracted to women.
And because his employer would have been as quick to fire a lesbian as it
was a gay man, the employers conclude, no Title VII violation has
occurred.52

As the majority in Bostock points out, this argument is
fundamentally flawed because it improperly assumes a single factor
causation standard, which is not the requirement under Title VII. 53
However, including bisexuals at this point in the analysis would have
revealed another glaring hole in the employers’ argument: even under
their wishfully thought-up single-cause framework, in the case of the
bisexual employee discriminated against because of her or her partner’s
sex, every factor really is constant other than sex. To elaborate, when a
female bisexual employee is discriminated against because her partner is
female, but a male bisexual employee with a female partner is not
similarly discriminated against, sex is the only variance between the two
scenarios, while sexual orientation is held constant. Similarly, if a
bisexual employee is discriminated against when her partner is female,
but not when she has a male partner, once again, sex is the only thing that
changed from one scenario to the next. Everything else is
constant, including the bi employee’s sexual orientation. Thus, bisexuals
can provide a clear depiction of how sexual orientation discrimination

51
See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739–40 (explaining that under Title VII, a plaintiff can prevail by
showing that sex was just one “motivating factor” in an adverse employment decision, but even under
a “but-for” causation analysis, discrimination is actionable where more than one factor contributed
to a negative employment decision).
52
Id. at 1747–48.
53
Id. at 1739–40, 1748–49.
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really is a form of prohibited sex discrimination, rebutting arguments to
the contrary.
This is just one example of how bi inclusion can strengthen LGBTQ
rights discourse, advocacy, and jurisprudence. More generally, bi
inclusion resolves the problems of bi erasure, while further strengthening
LGBTQ rights discourse through a more honest and inclusive approach
that rejects the rigid and confining identity-erasing categorizations from
which LGBTQ people as a whole have long sought their liberty.
CONCLUSION
Why did the Bostock decision fail to even acknowledge the existence
of bisexuals along with gay and transgender employees? It was not solely
because of the parties’ particular identities in that case, as the question
presented in Bostock and Zarda was about sexual orientation generally,
not solely about the particular plaintiffs’ sexual orientations.54 Indeed, Mr.
Bostock’s written and oral arguments were explicitly inclusive of
lesbians,55 although he is not a lesbian, which begs the question of why
his petition to the Court did not similarly acknowledge the existence of
bisexuals.
Regardless of the reasons why Mr. Bostock’s attorneys made the
strategic decision to reference “gays and lesbians” but not bisexuals, by
doing so they signaled the acceptability of bi erasure and led the Court to
54
As a bit of tangential irony, Mr. Bostock was fired after his employer discovered he was on a
gay softball league. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737–38. A decade prior, the 2008 Gay Softball World
Series was the subject of a one-of-a-kind lawsuit filed by the National Center for Lesbian Rights
against the North American Gay Amateur Athletic Alliance (NAGAAA), which settled the case after
subjecting three bisexual softball players to hours of intrusive interrogation and discrimination for
being deemed too “non-gay” to play in the Gay Softball World Series, despite NAGAAA's mission
statement explicitly “celebrat[ing] inclusivity and stat[ing] that its mission is to promote amateur
competition ‘for all persons regardless of age, sexual orientation or preference, with special emphasis
on the participation of members of the gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender (GLBT) community.’”
Apilado v. N. Am. Gay Amateur Athletic All., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1156, 1159 (W.D. Wash. 2011)
(emphasis added); see also Parties Settle Case Challenging Disqualification of Bisexual Players’
Team at 2008 Gay Softball World Series, NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RTS. (Nov. 28, 2011),
http://www.nclrights.org/about-us/press-release/parties-settle-case-challenging-disqualification-ofbisexual-players-team-at-2008-gay-softball-world-series/ [https://perma.cc/C7N9-GNC4]. The court
held that it was impermissible for the “gay” softball organization to exclude bisexual or heterosexual
players who were presumed to not “share” the “values” of gay people. See Apilado, 792 F. Supp. 2d
at 1156. From discussions with lead LGBTQ rights impact litigators and a review of published case
law, that case appears to have been the only such publicized case brought by an LGBTQ rights
organization against another LGBTQ organization to assert the rights of bisexuals against
discrimination by gay people, and it raises the question of whether an employer who discriminates
against an employee (such as Mr. Bostock) for being on a gay softball league is necessarily
discriminating against the employee for being gay, as opposed to being bisexual.
55
See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.
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engage in similar erasure. Such has been the case in LGBTQ rights
litigation for decades. The Court’s bi erasure in Bostock is just the latest
example of the bi erasure that has occurred in every LGBTQ rights
Supreme Court decision since Romer v. Evans.56
Unfortunately, the Court’s bi erasure in Bostock is not unique. For
decades, bisexuals have been expected to acquiesce to their erasure and
quietly accept that the rights explicitly affirmed for their gay and
transgender friends will trickle down to them as well. And trickle down
they should: a careful reading of Bostock supports extending its holding
to bisexuals.
A better Bostock opinion, however, would have been a bi-inclusive
opinion that recognizes the role bisexuals can play in illustrating that
when an employee is treated worse when dating someone of the same sex
than when dating someone of a different sex, despite being bisexual all
along, that discrimination is clearly “because” of sex for Title VII
purposes.
Without such an explicit recognition of how Title VII’s sex
discrimination protections also apply to bisexuals—even though Title VII
should apply to bisexuals as well as to straight and gay people, as do other
laws that protect against sexual orientation discrimination57—citing
Bostock for that proposition will not be a straightforward path. The
holding’s “gay and transgender”-specific language will not be as easy for
bisexuals to cite as precedential authority for the assertion of rights as it
will be for gay and transgender people. In future cases, bisexuals may be
required to add additional layers of argument explaining why the Bostock
holding should be interpreted as applying equally to them even though it
only explicitly names gay and transgender people.
With the Sixth Circuit’s pending reconsideration of Breiner v. Board
of Education,58 the first federal appellate decision regarding the
applicability of Title VII and Bostock to bisexual employees may come
sooner rather than later. While there is no chance of bisexuality being
erased in Breiner, a case explicitly about a bisexual employee, there is
still the danger that the defendant may try to use the erasure of bisexuals
in the text of Bostock as an argument against bisexual employees’ Title
56

See supra notes 18 and 20 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11139.8(a)(5) (West 2017); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34301(5)(b), (7) (West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 19A, § 43 (West 2018); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 5, § 4553 (9-C) (2019); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645.321(3)(d) (West 2019); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 57-21-2 (23) (West 2015).
58
No. 19-5123 (6th Cir.), on appeal from Breiner v. Brd. of Educ., No. 18-351-KKC, 2019 WL
454117 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 25, 2019).
57
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VII protections. For all the reasons detailed herein, that argument should
not succeed, but Mr. Breiner’s attorneys must be prepared to confront it
nonetheless.
Throughout decades of bisexual erasure leading up to Breiner,
including and long before Bostock, bi people have been consistently
reminded that our equal dignity may be denied at any turn, our identity
trivialized or erased entirely, by the bench, the bar, and beyond.
Hopefully, while Bostock marks the end of unchecked employment
discrimination against LGBTQ people, Breiner will mark the beginning
of the end of bisexual erasure.
It is time. The cumulative stigma of persistent bisexual erasure over
the decades is crushing with its wearying weight, especially when even
the lawyers representing LGBTQ clients fail to acknowledge bisexuals’
existence and rights. This is a particularly poignant truth when the latest
blatant erasure by the Supreme Court occurred in an opinion centered on
the importance of taking text literally and seriously. Words matter, and
they should be weighed more carefully in the future. The bench and bar
can do better by bisexuals.
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